Introduction
Although Hans Reichenbach would not have accepted the thesis presented here, this paper is in several ways inspired by his philosophy, and in particular by his book The Direction of Time (Reichenbach 1956 ). Firstly, this paper addresses an important metaphysical question the significance of which Reichenbach was the first to appreciate, namely, what exactly is it that constitutes the direction of causation. I will focus here on causal processes, and approach the question from that angle: what is it that constitutes the direction of a causal process? Secondly, the approach will be to follow a tradition, exemplified by Reichenbach, of tackling a metaphysical question via a careful study of contemporary science and its implications for metaphysics. I begin here with brief presentation of a recent solution to one of the deep problems in quantum mechanics involving Bell phenomena: the backwards in time causality model. I wish to examine the implications of this physical model for the philosophical question about the direction of causal processes, and in particular to use it as a premise in the assessment of various philosophical theories of the direction of causation.
Thirdly, I will be proposing and defending a version of Reichenbach's own theory about the direction of causation, the fork asymmetry account. I will defend this general account against some recent criticisms, and I will use the premise of backwards causation as a tool to defend my particular version of the fork account. This argument will not convince philosophers who reject the idea of backwards causation, of course; the paper is aimed primarily at those who accept it. However, it turns out that the conjunction of the backwards model of Bell phenomena and the favoured fork theory suggests a general formula for an empirical test, which, if positive, would provide reason to reconsider the rejection of backwards causation.
Backwards causation and Bell phenomena
In my opinion the most potent scientific reason for supposing that causation does operate backwards in time is the backwards causation model of Bell phenomena in quantum mechanics. Although it has not achieved widespread acceptance, the model has a number of prominent proponents. 1 We need look at the model only in its barest outline. The problem concerning Bell phenomena can be summarised as follows.
Consider a system involving two particles, A and B, flying out in opposite directions from a preparation event at a source, S. Suppose there are several possible measurements one could subsequently perform on these particles, and that a different measurement is performed on each of the pair. We may treat the actual measurements as causal interactions between the experimenter and the particle. Call these interactions M a and M h . Leaving aside numerous niceties, relevant experimental results entail that, if the source prepares the pair of particles in the so-called singlet state, one of the following two propositions is false:
(1) There is no causal connection between the act of measurement on A and the result of the measurement on B, i.e. between causal interactions M a and M h . (2) The measurement reveals an underlying reality about the particle, which exists independently of the measurement.
(2) is important because it entails the truth of certain counterfactuals of the form:
(2') If the alternative measurement had been performed on A, the result would have been where (2') is deduced from known correlations between A and B and the result of the measurement on B, together with assumptions (1) and (2). Bell reasoning then deduces from (1) and (2') predictions which contradict both the quantum mechanical prediction and the experimental results. So it is thought that either (1) or (2) must be abandoned, but the problem is that neither avenue is particularly appealing, for a variety of well known reasons. The backwards causality model suggests a physically well defined mechanism by which proposition (1) is violated (see Figure 1 ). Essentially the idea is that the act of measurement on particle A brings about causal influence which propagates backwards in time to the source of the two particles, whereupon it is partially causally responsible for some hid-den characteristics of the state S of that pair of particles.
2 Those characteristics are in turn causally responsible for the outcome of the measurement on B? Thus the claim is that the difficulty is resolved by the hypothesis of backwards causation.
Figure 1: The Backwards Causality Model
For the sake of the argument of this paper I shall take it that this hypothesis is true, and that in fact this is precisely what happens in Bell phenomena. The purpose of the paper is to show what follows from such an assumption for philosophical theories of the direction of causal processes. We turn firstly to a discussion of the direction of causal processes.
Causal processes and causal direction
Before we look at the notion of the direction of a causal process, I need to say a little about what I understand a process to be. Traditionally, philosophical discussions of causality have focussed on causal relations. A much less popular but nevertheless fruitful alternative approach is to focus on processes. For example, in Human Knowledge Bertrand Russell describes what he calls "causal lines":
A causal line may always be regarded as the persistence of something-a person, a table, a photon, or what not. Throughout a given causal line, there may be constancy of quality, constancy of structure, or gradual change in either, but not sudden change of any considerable magnitude. (Russell 1948, p. 459) Wesley Salmon has developed this idea of a causal process in two ways. Firstly, Salmon shows how to exclude pseudo processes, making use of Reichenbach's "mark criterion": a process is causal if it is capable of transmitting a local modification in structure (a "mark") (Salmon 1984, p. 147) . The difference between causal and pseudo processes need not concern us here. 4 Secondly, Salmon introduces the notion of an interaction: the intersection of two causal processes constitutes an interaction if both processes are marked by the interaction. Thus the causal structure of the world involves a network of causal interactions linked by causal processes. Salmon quotes John Venn to effect:
Substitute for the time honoured "chain of causation", so often introduced into discussions upon this subject, the phrase a "rope of causation", and see what a very different aspect the question will wear. (Salmon 1984, p. 183) A fruitful development of the Russell-Salmon approach is to think of processes as worms in space-time, which may be represented on a space-time diagram.
5 A process then will occupy a definite worm-like region of spacetime, and will have two endpoints, A and B say. An immediate objection to the suggestion that a process is a worm in space-time is that it allows that processes need not endure, or be extended in time. An example of a worm in space-time that is not extended in time is the short-lived string. Imagine that God in an instantaneous act creates a mile-long string extended roughly in a straight line, but then annihilates it one millisecond later. This short-lived string will be a worm in space-time, but it is not extended in time. For example, its endpoints are simultaneous in Newtonian time.
On the strength of this objection one may wish to modify the suggestion, for example, restricting processes to timelike worms in space-time. However, this will exclude some so-called pseudo processes such as shadows and spots of light, since pseudo processes can travel faster than the speed of light. Causal processes cannot travel faster then the speed of light, but non-causal processes can. Suppose then we don't require that a process be timelike, but that its endpoints differ substantially with respect to their times. However, although this might work for Newtonian time, it runs into problems with special relativity, since any two possible endpoints of space-like worms are simultaneous in some physically possible frame of reference. Therefore I accept the result that the short-lived string is a process (although I deny that it is a causal process), and will stick with the formulation that a process is a worm in space-time. 6 The standard approach to the question of the direction of causation is to consider the causal relation. The singular causal relation, which relates a particular cause to its effect, is almost universally thought to be asym-metric; for example, if my hitting the glass with a hammer caused it to break then it cannot be the case that the glass breaking caused my hitting it with the hammer. If the singular causal relation is asymmetric, then it clearly has a direction. For the arrow of causation points from the cause to the effect, and that direction is fixed in virtue of the relation obtaining, since if a causes b, then the causation occurs "from a to b", and not "from b to a". How to explicate that notion of direction is a difficult matter, and there are a number of philosophical theories as to how it is to be done.
However, it is even more difficult to say in what sense a causal process has a direction. The ordinary concept of a process does involve a direction. If we speak of the process of an apple decaying, or an atom decaying, we are thinking of the process "moving" in a direction, of having a starting point and a culmination point. But if a process is just a definite wormlike region in space-time then we must ask, in what sense may a definite wormlike region in space-time have a direction? We cannot say that regions in space-time "go" or "move" in any direction; that doesn't make sense. 7 The problem is particularly acute when one considers the temporal symmetry of the laws of physics, a consideration which has led some scientists and philosophers to be eliminativists about the direction of causation. The primary task of this paper is to address this problem about the direction of causal processes.
Bell phenomena fit easily into the "process" way of thinking. The world-line of the particle as it moves from the source to the measurement is a process; 8 the world-line of the other particle is another process; while the separation at the source is an interaction. The measurements should also be taken as interactions. It is clear that if the backwards causation model is to work, there must be a sense to the idea of the direction of a causal process. For the suggestion is that the causal influence goes, via the causal process, in a direction contrary to the usual direction of causal influence. There must be an objective difference between the directions of the two processes.
There are a number of philosophical theories about the direction of the causal relation. In what follows I will adapt these theories to the notion of a causal process, to see whether any can make sense of the direction of a causal process in a way that is compatible with the backwards causation model of quantum mechanics. That is, I will not be attempting to prove anything about the direction of causal processes per se. I am just starting with a premise, viz, the truth of the backwards causation model, and I seek to determine what follows from that premise concerning the direction of causal processes. I argue that some very unusual conclusions follow, including an empirical prediction capable of confirming the backwards causality model.
My conclusion, then, clearly is open to being refuted: if the predictions prove to be false, then we may be forced to take all this as an argument against the backwards causation model. Philosophers who in any case find the notion of backwards-in-time causation repugnant on other grounds may prefer to take my argument as a reductio of the model. My only response to this is to point out that if the predictions suggested below were confirmed then that would provide grounds for sceptics to think twice. In the absence of such evidence, I prefer simply to direct my argument towards those who are attracted to the idea of backwards causality, and to examine the implications of that kind of commitment.
There are roughly three kinds of theories of causal direction: the temporal, the subjective and the physical. 9 The temporal theory is widely held amongst philosophers, but is easily dismissed in the present context. This theory asserts that the direction of causation is defined by the direction of time. David Hume, for example, held this view: two objects A and B are related as cause and effect respectively only if A is precedent to B (Hume, 1978, p. 169) . Thus, by definition, the direction of causation is the direction of time, as a matter of conceptual necessity. An effect cannot be prior to or simultaneous with its cause.
Clearly, the temporal theory is incompatible with the backwards-intime model. By definition, it is impossible for a later measurement to have causal influence on the earlier state of the particle pair. Therefore, given that we are seeking to understand the direction of causation in a fashion adequate to the explication of the backwards causation model, we must rule out of contention the temporal theory.
So the theories we shall take seriously are the subjective and the physical. The physical theory attempts to reduce causal asymmetry to something physical in the world. The subjective theory attempts to explain causal asymmetry as something we add to the world. We shall deal with these in turn.
9 See Dowe (1992a) for more discussion of this three-way division.
The subjective theory
According to the subjective account, causal asymmetry is not a feature of the world of objects, events and processes but rather of the way we see those objects, events and processes. Subjectivism comes in two forms. A stronger form holds that causation itself is not an objective matter. An example of this stronger form is the manipulability account of causation, which holds that causation is to be analysed in terms of agency, the human capacity to act to make a difference in the world.
10 A weaker form holds that while causation itself is objective, the direction of causation is subjective. An example of this weaker form is the eliminativism of Wheeler and Feynman, who, on account of the symmetry of the laws of nature, regarded as physically equivalent the statements "The glass broke because it was hit with a hammer" and "The hammer hit the glass because it was going to break it" (cited in Horwitz et al., 1988 Horwitz et al., , p. 1161 . The arguments presented here will apply to either form.
Subjectivism has recently been defended by Huw Price, under the label of "perspectivism". According to Price: in a certain sense causal asymmetry is not in the world, but is rather a product of our own asymmetric perspective on the world. We ourselves are strikingly asymmetric in time. We remember the past and act for the future, to mention two of the more obvious aspects of this asymmetry. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that the effects of this asymmetry will come to be deeply entrenched in the ways in which we describe our surroundings; nor that this entrenchment should not wear its origins on its sleeve, so that it would be easy to disentangle its contribution from that part of our descriptions we might then think of as perspective-independent. (Price 1992, pp. 513-4) It is not obvious to us that causal asymmetry is subjective, and intuitively we might feel that it is an objective matter. But if we compare the case of colour, Price argues, we will recognise that sometimes a perspectival aspect of the world will not immediately be recognised as such. Before the seventeenth century the common view of colour was that it existed wholly in the objects, and it took advances in science and philosophy to recognise that there is a subjective aspect to colour.
On the subjective account, backwards-in-time causation may well be possible. If we could view the world differently, and see processes as going backwards in time, or causes occurring after their effects, then that would be backwards-in-time causation. However, the kind of backwards causation required in the backwards causation model of Bell phenomena is not possible on the subjectivist account. For that model to work, the distinction between the direction of process M a -S and the direction of process 5-M h must be objective, because subjective aspects cannot appear in basic physical theories of the objective world. If causation's direction is but a function of the way we experience the world, then we cannot solve paradoxes in the quantum realm by positing it there.
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Consider, for example, the disanalogy with colour. One plausible account of colour says that part of the notion of colour is subjective, but that part does not ever appear in physical theories, for example in surface physics. It is precisely because colour does not appear in the physical theory of the objects that we think of it as subjective. Indeed, it is only because colour does not appear in the physical theory that we think of it as subjective. Had a full physical reduction of colour been available, the issue of colour being a secondary quality would not have arisen, because objects would have been red independently of anyone perceiving them and colour would have been taken as objective. But colour is subjective, and a world without observers of any kind would not be a coloured world. On the other hand causal direction does appear in physical theory, so it cannot be subjective. If the backwards model is correct then, even if there never were observers of any kind, there would still be backwards-in-time causation whenever there are Bell phenomena. Price (1994) has recently offered a detailed defence against this kind of objection. Price argues that even though causal asymmetry is perspectival, it is nonetheless "objectified" in the sense that we are not normally free to see things any other way. The reason is that we deliberators are orientated one way in time, in that we take the input for deliberation from the past not the future, as if the past is fixed and the future open. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which we could deliberate in the reverse direction. These circumstances would have to be ones in which we could not possibly know about the earlier effect of our later action until that action is completed, otherwise on seeing the earlier effect we could decide not to carry out the cause (socalled "bilking").
However, this is exactly the situation we find in the Bell case. For the only way we can know about the relevant hidden facts about the earlier state S is via a measurement such as M a or some mutually exclusive alter-native to M a .
n Thus it is physically impossible to know the hidden part of S in time to decide to change the cause, M a .
It follows, Price claims, that there are two possible objective microstructures which have different implications for how we may view the direction of causation. Normal or "classical" structures do not rule out bilking and thus do not permit a backwards interpretation. But Bell correlations, between say the hidden part of S and M a , do allow a backwards interpretation. Thus the "objective core", as Price calls it, of the backwards-in-time interpretation is just this correlation between M a and S; that is between an earlier hidden state and a later choice of measurement.
However, it seems to me that this fails to answer the objection. We should ask the question, are we deliberators forced to interpret this correlation as backwards causation? What I mean by this is: in the same way that under normal conditions we are not free to see things other than in the usual direction; so, under these special conditions is it the case that we are not free to see things other than in a backwards direction? If the answer is "no", as Price appears to hold, then it's hard to see how the process M a -S has the requisite objective direction. That objective facts make it possible to interpret the process as going backwards in time, doesn't mean that that interpretation gains the status of "objective". Clearly, if both a backwards or a forwards interpretation are possible, then objectivity of the backwards interpretation is not secured. It is not even "objectified" in Price's sense.
In fact such a correlation does leave open a choice. We could see it as (1) backwards causation, (2) normal causation, where the hidden state directly causes the choice of measurement, or (3) so-called "cryptodeterminism", 14 where S and M a have a common cause, e.g. something in the experimenter's past which determines his choice and which also brings about the hidden state S. In other words, the objective core by itself does not have any implications for the direction of causation; and the bilking loophole simply makes backwards causation possible. Thus the objective facts do not serve to necessitate or "objectify" the backwards perspective.
13 In Price's terms:
The claimed earlier effect is the arrangement of spins in the directions G and H which are later to be measured. But what would it take to detect this arrangement in any particular case? It would take, clearly, a measurement of the spins of particles concerned in the directions G and H. However, such a measurement is precisely the kind of event which is being claimed to have this earlier effect. So there seems to be no way to set up the experiment whose contradictory results would constitute a causal paradox. By the time the earlier effect has been detected its later cause has already taken place. (Price 1994, p. 317) 14 To borrow, and change, Belinfante's term (1973) .
On the other hand, suppose the answer were "yes", i.e., we are forced to interpret the correlation as backwards. Even then, the defence would not work. For we must now ask the question, is our perspective here objectified in full by features of the physical system, or not? If the answer to this second question is "no", then the objectivity uncovered is not objectivity enough. Consider again the analogy with colour. Suppose physicalism is correct, and our experience of seeing red the way we do is a product of our hard-wired physiology. Then we humans are forced to see a certain kind of object in certain circumstances as red, which means that our experience of seeing red is "objectified" in Price's sense. But being red remains a subjective matter, since being red it is not a pure quality of the physical objects. So this kind of "objectivity" is not the kind of objectivity required for a physical theory. Perspectivism "objectified" is not objectivity enough.
But if the answer to this second question is "yes", that is, in Bell cases our perspective is objectified in full by features of the physical system, then it would seem that causal direction could not be perspectival after all, at least not in this case. For something to be perspectival it must be added by us, even if it is "objectified" in the sense that we have no choice but to adopt that perspective. But in this case causal direction is not added by us but is completely given by features of the physical system. So it appears that there is no way to adequately objectify perspectivism. If this reasoning is right, then the truth of the backwards in time model does rule out the subjective account of causal direction, as our initial argument claimed.
The physical theory: fork asymmetry
The idea of fork asymmetry was first articulated by Hans Reichenbach (1956) , who begins with the notion of a causal fork. This may be defined as a set of three events two of which are the joint effects of the third, the common cause. For example, the presence of a virus in a heated room is the common cause of the joint effects of two brothers both getting the flu. In terms of processes, we may define a causal fork as the case where two causal processes arise out of one causal interaction.
Joint effects of a common cause tend to be correlated in one way or another. They bear the marks of their common causal ancestry. The effects of the virus on one brother tend to be similar to the effects of the virus on the other. If one wishes to analyse such correlations one must turn to statistical relations, said Reichenbach. This brings us to the question of conjunctive forks.
Simplifying for the sake of exposition, 15 a conjunctive fork may be defined as a set of three events A, B and C such that For the sake of the present discussion we may follow Reichenbach in taking these probabilities as relative frequencies.
(1) expresses a statistical correlation between two events, namely, that they are not independent. If the joint probability were equal to the product of the separate probabilities then they would be independent. (2) expresses what Reichenbach calls a "screening-off' relation, where a third event C is found which when accounted for, renders A and B independent. Together such a set of events form a conjunctive fork. The significance of the conjunctive fork is that Reichenbach held that we can use it to characterise causal forks statistically. For example, suppose the probability of a person taken randomly from the general population having the flu at any given time is 1/10, and that the joint probability of two members of one family having the flu is 1/60. Then we have an example of the correlation depicted in (1) (since 1/60 > 1/100). Thus (1) gives us a precise way to express the idea of a correlation between separated events. However, if the sole reason that brothers have both caught the flu is that they were both in a heated room where a virus was present, then this fact, C, will screen off the correlation, according to (2).
We can take it as read that A and B are roughly simultaneous, but we haven't said whether the common cause C is in the past or the future of the events it screens off. Can we in fact find a conjunctive fork where C occurs after A and B? The answer is "yes".
Suppose instead of the flu, the brothers catch a rare and dangerous viral disease RDV. Call these unfortunate events A' and B'. Then, again, since either may catch it from the other, Suppose a short time later they both end up in the RDV unit in the local hospital: event E. Since this is the only kind of disease that is handled by this unit, the probability that a person has succumbed to RDV given that they are later in the RDV ward is 1. So
P(A'.B'\E) = P(A'\E) x P(B'\E) = 1.
This is equation (2); that is, we have another conjunctive fork, where E screens-off the earlier correlation between A' and B'. So we can have a conjunctive fork where the screening-off event occurs after the correlated events.
But this is the second screening-off event for that correlation, since, just as with the flu, the correlation would also be screened-off by the earlier event C-that the brothers were in a heated room where the virus was present. So This is a contingent claim about the way the world actually is. Reichenbach claimed that we find conjunctive forks which are closed, we find conjunctive forks which are open to the future, but we never find conjunctive forks open to the past. Correlations in fact are never screened off by a future event, except where they are also screened off by a past event. So can we find a conjunctive fork where C occurs after A and B and there is no screening off event before A and Bl Reichenbach's answer is "no".
We now turn, as Reichenbach did, to an account of the direction of causation. Roughly the idea of a fork asymmetry account of the direction of causation is that the direction of causal processes is given by the direction of open conjunctive forks. Then we may call the screening off event of an open fork a "cause" and the events screened off "effects". This, together with the asymmetry thesis that all (or most) actual open forks are open to the future, explains why causes always (or mostly) precede their effects.
But this rough idea is ambiguous. In fact there are at least three possible ways this could be taken. The first is how some contemporary philosophers explicate it; the second is Reichenbach's version; and the third is the version which I wish to articulate and defend as the best available account of causal asymmetry. It is important to distinguish these various versions, because, as I shall argue, they are open to different kinds of objections.
Fork theory version one
Version one goes as follows: The direction of a causal process is given by the direction of an open conjunctive fork part-constituted by that process. This is essentially the version defended by Papineau, except that he discusses events rather than processes: (SO) Take any event C. Then among the events which are correlated with C will be some that are correlated with each other in such a way that their correlation is screened off by C-these are C's effects; and among the events which are correlated with C will also be some that are not correlated with each other-these will be C's causes. (Papineau 1993, pp. 239-40)' 6 This account of causal asymmetry has recently been subject to close scrutiny by Huw Price. According to Price the fork asymmetry is "not a sufficiently basic and widespread feature of the world to constitute the difference between cause and effect" (Price 1992, p. 502) .' 7 This argument is claimed to work equally well for other related physical asymmetries such as Popper's asymmetry of radiation: wave phenomena such as ripples on a lake radiate out from a central source but never converge into a central sink; and Lewis' asymmetry of overdetermination: in general an event has numerous future determinants (events minimally sufficient for that event, given the laws of nature), but rarely has more than one past determinant.
The first step in Price's argument is to claim that the relevant asymmetry (fork, radiation or overdetermination) is thermodynamic in origin; that is, the asymmetry arises because of the de facto thermodynamic disequilibrium that happens to obtain in our stage of the universe. In other words, the various physical asymmetries in question all reduce to the thermodynamic asymmetry, that the amount of entropy in our universe is increasing on account of the fact that we are moving out of a low entropy, or highly ordered initial state.
The second step in the argument is to point out that the thermodynamic asymmetry is a macroscopic phenomenon, which is not present, or "visible", at the microscopic level. The laws of nature which govern the motion of molecules are completely symmetric with respect to time, and it is only at the macroscopic level that we see irreversible processes, processes which involve a transition from low entropy initial conditions to higher entropy later conditions. This is because entropy is a property of a macrostate and is defined in terms of the number of possible microstates which correspond to that macrostate, relative to the total number of possible microstates.
Therefore, if causal asymmetry is grounded in thermodynamic asymmetry, there can be causal asymmetry only at the macro level. In other words, these physical theories of causal asymmetry entail that there is no asymmetric causation at the micro level. This is unacceptable for two reasons, Price argues. Firstly it conflicts with reductionist intuitions to the effect that macro causal links are constituted by micro causal links, and secondly it conflicts with physicists' talk about the micro world in causal terms. Therefore the de facto physical asymmetry that we find in the world is not sufficiently general or basic to account for the asymmetry of causation.
However, this argument from microscopic symmetry goes wrong at step two. In fact, because order in our world is not restricted to heatrelated phenomena, the notion of entropy is not restricted to macrostates of systems with microstates. Entropy can also be a feature of a purely microscopic system, or of a purely macroscopic system. In fact, the notion of entropy applies to any coarse grained characterisation of a system.
A purely microscopic example is the case of four molecules in a microscopic box, where each possible combination of positions is equally probable. One relatively ordered state of this system is when the four particles "form a square", i.e. are positioned on the four corners of any square within the box. The entropy of this state is given in terms of the number of possible combinations which instantiate this formula, relative to the total number of possible combinations of positions. But there is nothing macroscopic about the state "forms a square".
A purely macroscopic example is the case of a billiards game. The initial set up is a low entropy state in that if we assume that every position on the table is equally probable, for each ball, then the number of possible combinations which constitute a lawful starting configuration is small compared to the total number of possible configurations.
Therefore, if step one of Price's argument is right, and the physical asymmetries (fork, radiation, overdetermination) reduce to entropic asymmetry, then we will find these asymmetries in purely microscopic systems whenever the system is evolving from a highly ordered state to a less ordered state. So, since the microscopic world which constitutes the macroscopic universe we know is a system characterised by high initial order, it follows that the kinds of asymmetries appealed to in the various physical theories of causal asymmetry do arise microscopically.
18 It follows, then, that this argument supplies no reason at all to conclude that the fork asymmetry is not a sufficiently widespread and basic phenomenon to constitute the difference between cause and effect.
However, apart from Price's point about the failure of fork asymmetry in the microworld, there is another way that the fork asymmetry might fail to be sufficiently widespread. Suppose a given interaction has a limited number of correlated effects, and that in each case those effects themselves have a common effect, so that in each case we have a closed fork rather than an open fork.
19 Then, since on this theory a process which does not part-constitute an open fork has no direction, or its direction is undefined, the theory entails that the processes linking this interaction to its "effects" have no direction.
This problem is particularly acute if, as seems to me to be likely, there are not many open forks about. One way out is to hold to the hope that in fact open forks are prevalent, even if we aren't always aware of them. This hope, which we may dub "conjunctivitis", because it envisages hidden conjunctive forks everywhere, may turn out to be little more than wishful thinking. But even if I am wrong about the extent of this problem, the fact remains that there are some actual cases of closed forks, where a process part-constitutes no open fork. It will follow by definition that that causal process has no direction.
Fork theory: version two
Version two, which is in fact the line that Reichenbach took, goes as follows: Processes tend to be linked together in a net of causal processes and interactions. At least some sections of the net constitute open forks. All open forks in fact are open to the future, so the net as a whole can be said to have a direction, namely, the direction of the open forks contained within it. This direction then constitutes the direction of each individual process in the net. 20 If the fork asymmetry thesis has a few exceptions, the theory can be weakened to the effect that the direction of a net is given by the direction of the majority of open forks.
21
This second version has, as an advantage over the first, the consequence that all processes have a direction. Any process which is part of a wider net of causal processes and interactions takes on the direction of the net as a whole. If there are isolated nets, which are not connected to each other in any way, then those nets may have different directions, but still, every process in those nets will have a definite direction. The only cases which 19 Arntzenius (1990) argues in effect that in a deterministic world every conjunctive fork is closed in this way, although his argument requires an unrealistically inclusive account of events.
20 See Dowe (1992a) for an extended elaboration of this view. 2 'Cases of processes converging to or diverging from an interaction are not necessarily cases of statistical forks; they will not be if there is no correlation between the processes. Reichenbach held the view that causality can be reduced to probabilistic relations of this sort; I do not hold that view (see Dowe 1993b) . will fail to have a definite direction will be cases where there is a net containing no open forks, or no clear majority of open forks in either direction, such as in the heat death of the universe.
But, while the second version avoids that problem, it also faces a more serious objection: it is incompatible with the backwards causation model. Consider again the process between S (the source) and M a (a measurement) in the Bell setup. On this theory the direction of this process is determined by the causal net in which it is found, which in turn is determined by the direction of the open forks in that net. Now a particular process cannot have a direction counter to those of the surrounding processes to which it is connected. But that is exactly what is proposed in the backwards causality model. The direction of causal influence from M a -S is postulated to be the reverse of the direction of the influence from S-M h , and the two processes must be connected together in a net. An entire net, unconnected to the rest of the universe, could take on a counter direction, but that is not the scenario in the Bell setup. It is analytic that individual processes within a net cannot take different directions, if version two is correct. So Reichenbach's version rules out the kind of backwards causation required for the backwards causation model of Bell phenomena.
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The same kind of difficulty will be faced by the entropic theory (the direction of a causal process is given by the direction of entropy increase in the net of which that process is a part) and the Kaon theory (the direction of a causal process is given by the direction of T-violating kaon decay processes in the net of which that process is a part), both presented by myself in an earlier paper (Dowe 1992a ). There I argued that these accounts were compatible with the backwards causation model, but as is clear from the above discussion, this was a mistake.
Version one is clearly preferable on this score. If the direction of a causal process is given by the direction of an open conjunctive fork partconstituted by that process, and the asymmetry thesis is universally true, then there is no backwards causation. But if the asymmetry thesis admits of exceptions-occasional cases where forks are open to the past-then backwards causation is not only possible but actual: the processes constituting those forks have a backwards direction. 23 This opens up the possibility that the backwards model of Bell systems will work, although only 22 This would not particularly worry Reichenbach. In fact he went to some lengths to prove that such "anomalies", as he called them, don't occur. Reichenbach's purpose in proposing a fork theory of the direction of causation was the development of a causal theory of time. This requires that the causal direction not be defined in terms of time, but the causal theory of time itself rules out backwards-in-time causation.
23 Providing certain problems of indeterminacy and ambiguity can be avoided; for example, where the process part-constitutes a fork open to the future and also part-constitutes a fork open to the past. if the process from M a to S part-constitutes a conjunctive fork open to the past; a point to which we will return. So, to summarise the situation so far, version one faces the problem that many processes will most probably not have a direction, but it does leave open the possibility of backwards causation; while version two bestows a direction on all processes but rules out backwards causation. Fortunately, a third version achieves a synthesis wherein both problems are solved.
Fork theory: version three
Version three goes as follows: The direction of a causal process is given by the direction of an open conjunctive fork part-constituted by that process; or, if there is no such conjunctive fork, by the direction of the majority of open forks contained in the net in which the process is found. This account simply disjoins the conditions of version one and version two in such a way as to give primacy to version one. The clause from version two is, as it were, the backup measure. Consequently, there is a sense in which there are two grades, or ways, in which a process can have a direction. The primary kind of direction derives from direct participation in an open fork; the secondary kind derives indirectly, by association, from the net in which the process is located. Whatever the shortcomings of this suggestion may be, it solves the problems which the other two versions face: it does bestow a direction on all processes, and it does leave open the possibility of backwards causation.
Perhaps more needs to be said about the extent of the net. Suppose the causal net in which a process is found extends a great distance in space and time. In this case is the "net" the entire net, or just a localised region of this net? We should take the answer to be the entire net, extending to the entire universe for substantial periods of time, applying if necessary to that space-time region to which the phenomenological second law of thermodynamics applies. (If it extends any further, say into the heat death of the universe, then there will be no direction to which the majority of open forks point.)
According to an objection due to Michael Tooley, the fork theory has the consequence that the direction of a causal process is made true by things extrinsic to the process. This is counterintuitive, Tooley says, especially if we are faced with a situation where the direction of a particular process is determined by correlated effects which occur much later (Tooley 1987, p. 237 and 1993, p. 22) . This objection applies to the different versions to differing extents. According to version one, the direction of a process is given by the direction of the open fork it part-constitutes, which is a relatively local affair, compared to version two, according to which the direction is given by the net in which it is located. Version three shares this defect, if it is a defect. But Tooley's principle that the direction of a causal process is something intrinsic to a process is not something that can be proved simply by appeal to such an intuition. After all, that intuition may be false, or at least, I don't think it is something that the proponent of the fork asymmetry theory needs bow to, especially in the absence of any satisfactory account which tells us what the intrinsic direction of a causal process amounts to. Consider the cases of colour and heat. At one time folk intuitions about colour would have said that colour was intrinsic to the objects; that proved false. Or, even closer to home, folk intuitions may tell us that certain irreversible processes have an intrinsic direction, which we also know to be false. So, I suggest that we simply accept this consequence and admit that we must appeal to extrinsic features, and that this may well contradict folk intuitions.
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It remains to outline the promised empirical consequence of the fork theory, which if proved correct, would constitute confirmation of the backwards causation model of Bell phenomena. I will then conclude with some comments about the implications of rejecting the fork theory.
The empirical prediction
If version one or three of the fork theory of the direction of causal processes is correct, then cases of backwards causation involve conjunctive forks open to the past. In the case of Bell phenomena, this means that the backwards process M a -S is accompanied by another backwards process M a -x, where x is an unknown factor correlated with S such that S, M a and x form a conjunctive fork, x will be some factor in the apparent causal past of the measurement, perhaps something in the past of the measuring device or the experimenter, if one is directly involved. For example, it may be an itch that the experimenter feels about the time the experiment begins. If so, then the itch x and S, the preparation of the particles, will be correlated:
This is something that in principle could be sought, and found, experimentally. It is also necessary that there be no earlier event which screens off the dependence between x and S; if this is the case, then we have empirically confirmed backwards causation. As an empirical prediction we can only provide here a most abstract characterisation of the proposal. The general form of such a test is that we need to examine Bell experiments, looking for factors which have not previously been thought relevant, to see whether we can discover a previously unnoticed correlation between the preparation of the particles and some factor in the "causal past" of the measurement.
There is no reason why S needs always to be correlated with the same kind of event x. It just needs to be correlated with some event x, y or z. This would depend, presumably on the experimental arrangement. Just as with the firing of a gun, where the powder on my hand will be correlated with some kind of destruction somewhere, which kind depending on the circumstances, so also 5 will be correlated with some kind of event in the past of the measurement, which kind depending on the circumstances.
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It may be thought that the existence of such a correlation between x and S would close the bilking loophole, because one could know that x had occurred, and then prevent M a (its cause). However, this is not so. To know that x is an effect of M a one would have to know not only that x occurred, but also that 5 occurred (and by S we mean the state including the hidden part of S, as caused by M a ). But we cannot know that S has occurred until M a and M h occur. And so we cannot know that x is the effect of M a until M a and M h have occurred, and so bilking is not physically possible, even with knowledge of JC.
What if the fork theory is false?
What conclusions should we draw if the backwards causality model is correct, but, contrary to the above arguments, the fork theory is in fact unsatisfactory? For example, suppose one objects to the view that the direction of a causal process is extrinsic to the process, to the view that it is a de facto matter, or to its disjunctive nature. If so, then since we started with the premise of backwards causation, which requires a notion of a direction of a causal process, we are still owed an account of that direction. Our arguments against the temporal and the subjective accounts are comprehensive in the sense that they rule out any kind of temporal or subjective theory. But in the case of the physical theory, we have simply ruled out the extant versions of such a theory. We would conclude from this that there must be a satisfactory physical theory of a different kind to the ones we have considered, which perhaps no-one has yet thought of. Such a theory would identify the intrinsic and/or nomological feature of a causal process which constitutes its direction.
Such a view entails a very much more radical revision of current science than is envisaged in the empirical prediction outlined above. It would entail that the current laws of physics are radically incomplete, for this new physical theory would identify laws of nature which are in some way not time symmetric.
26 This is radical indeed; and makes my suggestion look fairly ordinary. This, I imagine, simply provides all the more reason to accept it.
For reasons similar to the sorts of reasons listed above, Tooley proposes what he calls a "realist" account of the direction of causation. Now a realist approach prompts the following question: is the direction of physical causal processes itself something essentially physical? (It seems that Tooley says no, since he holds that the direction is not reducible to physics.) If the answer is "yes", then we should follow the reasoning above, and infer that current physics is radically incomplete. If the answer is "no", the direction of causation is not something essentially physical, then the realist account is open to three objections. Firstly it seems to relegate the direction of a causal process to the realm of the epistemically inaccessible. 27 Secondly, even if we can get past the first point, we still need to ask why a "no" answer would be preferable to a "yes" answer. To prefer to say something is in principle irreducible to physics rather than as yet not reduced depends both on an unfounded pessimism about future physics and an unfounded belief in the completeness of current physics. Thirdly, it is not clear that Tooley's view is compatible with the backwards causality model, since that model seems to reveal pointers to a physical direction.
Thus it seems to me that there is a very strong case for saying that the backwards causality model of Bell phenomena leads us to a fork account of the direction of causal processes. If the suggested empirical test were to prove positive, this would constitute a strong reason for accepting both.
